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ABSTRACT
Due to the role of ultra-wealthy party donors in its enactment, the recent Republican tax law may be seen as a
case study in the systemic corruption of Congress that has concerned many commentators. For the most part, the
solutions they have offered to the problem have been political in nature. In the short-term, the unpopularity of
measures that so disproportionately benefit the very few will likely impose electoral costs resulting in repeal. In the
longer term, congressional action or constitutional amendment is required to radically reform the current system of
campaign finance. Regardless of the prospects of such future political responses, is there a legal solution in the
here and now that might be able to deal with any part of the problem the critics have identified? This Article
suggests there is. Beyond the very limited scope, prospects, and deterrent value of the criminal law of bribery, it
proposes an independent constitutional response in the form of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Federal statutes that are enacted by means of illegitimate procedures, including the paying or withholding of
donations for votes, violate the constitutional requirement of due process of lawmaking and should be invalidated
by the courts, whether or not such conduct is, or could be, the subject of a successful criminal prosecution.
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INTRODUCTION
Much of the specific criticism of the recent Republican tax bill1 along the
lines that it enacted into law the direct economic interests, and reflected the
enormous influence, of billionaire party donors2 mirrors the more general
contemporary literature on the institutional or systemic corruption of
Congress.3 Indeed, in this respect the tax law can be seen as a case study of
the latter. Both the specific and more general critics express deep concerns
about the process of congressional lawmaking in an era in which raising
money for election and re-election campaigns has become the primary
preoccupation of current and would-be legislators.
Both sets of critics also offer solutions to the perceived problem that are
essentially political in nature. On the tax law, the hope or expectation is that
the unpopularity of the measure, which so directly and disproportionately
benefits the ultra-wealthy few, will help to sweep the Democrats into power
in 2018 or 2020, resulting in amendment or repeal.4 For those arguing that
the more general dependence on campaign finance has rendered Congress
institutionally corrupt, the main proposed avenues for reform are either a
congressional statute aiming to transform the few who currently contribute
to political campaigns into the many, or a broader constitutional amendment
aiming at a similar effect.5 Of course, Republicans are betting that enough
ordinary voters will come to like their far smaller, immediate if temporary,
tax cuts to prevent a transfer of power; and, in any event, a corrupt Congress
may not be a reliable vehicle of reform,6 regardless of the party in charge,
leaving the near-unprecedented institution of the constitutional convention
as perhaps the last, best hope. But regardless of the prospects of future
political reform, is there a legal solution in the here and now that might be
able to deal with any part of the problem that both sets of critics have
1
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Individual Tax Reform and Alternative Minimum Tax, Pub. L. No. 115–97 (2017). For a copy of
the original bill, see An Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the
Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2018, H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017).
See sources cited infra Part I.
See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN
TO STOP IT (2011); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST: THE CORRUPTION OF EQUALITY AND THE
STEPS TO END IT (rev. ed., 2015) [hereinafter LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST]; ZEPHYR TEACHOUT,
CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLINS’ SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014).
See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
See infra note 30 and accompanying text. A different legislative solution to the problem—an internal
ethics rule requiring legislators who receive outsize campaign contributions to recuse themselves
from legislative actions that substantially benefit the donor—has been proposed in Justin Levitt,
Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 217, 231–32 (2010).
As Lessig acknowledges. See LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST, supra note 3, at 276–77.
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identified and illuminated? This Article suggests that there is. Beyond the
very limited scope, prospects, and deterrent value of the criminal law,7 it
proposes a constitutional response, in the form of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.8
With such a vivid example of the “economy of influence” as the recent
tax law currently in mind, this seems an opportune moment to revisit and
further explore the notion that the Constitution imposes on Congress a duty
of due process in lawmaking: a constitutionally mandated minimum
procedural standard for the enactment of statutes that presumes certain
processes are “undue” and rules them out. This idea, which is associated
with Hans Linde’s classic article of 1975,9 has not gained very much traction
among either judges or legal scholars in the intervening years,10 but it does
7
8
9
10

See infra Part II.
“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976).
In a dissent written a year after Linde’s article was published, Justice Stevens explicitly invoked the
term “due process of lawmaking,” Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 340 U.S. 73, 98 (1977)
(Stevens, J., dissenting), and three years later, another dissent stated that: “I see no reason why the
character of their [i.e., Congress’s] procedures may not be considered relevant to the decision
whether the legislative product has caused a deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.” Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 550 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting). To the
limited extent legal scholars have focused on issues of legislative process, it has tended to follow the
Supreme Court majority’s one area of interest in the general subject: the role of legislative findings
in justifying congressional use of its powers to regulate interstate commerce, see, e.g., United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (holding that, although the gender violence prevention
statute in question was supported by significant legislative findings, “the existence of congressional
findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation.”);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (holding a Congressional gun safety statute
unconstitutional as beyond the power of the Constitution’s Commerce Clause “in light of . . .
insufficient congressional findings and legislative history), and to abrogate state sovereign immunity
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (holding that “Section 5 does not so broadly enlarge congressional
authority” so as to allow private individuals to collect damage from a State for violation of the
ADA)); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (“Broad as the power of Congress is
under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital principles
necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.”); see also, Philip P. Frickey &
Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary
Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1711–13 (2002) (describing Linde’s conception of “procedural
regularity” as a deserving model of due process but not the one (“legislative deliberation” or
findings) they were interested in exploring). SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, STEFANIE EGIDY & JAMES
FOWKES, DUE PROCESS OF LAWMAKING: THE UNITED STATES, SOUTH AFRICA, GERMANY,
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (2015) is a broader, comparative treatment of public policymaking in
the legislative and executive branches. Although he does not specifically make much use of Linde
or the concept of due process of lawmaking per se, or focus on the issue of corruption, one exception
among legal scholars for his focus on judicial review of the legislative process is Ittai Bar-SimonTov. See generally Ittai Bar-Simon-Tov, Lawmakers as Lawbreakers, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805,
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potentially provide a narrowly tailored solution to the most egregious—
although by no means all—forms of contemporary corruption of Congress
within the existing Constitution. Arguably, it would encompass some of the
conduct that the specific criticism of the tax law describes. To achieve this
solution, however, Linde’s basic idea, which he left largely undeveloped,
must be refined and explored, its scope and content filled in, and his relative
lack of interest in (perhaps even skepticism about) judicial review of the
constitutional requirement of due process of lawmaking cast aside, as well as
the reasons for it addressed. This includes a reconsideration of the landmark
early case of Fletcher v. Peck,11 which Linde, reflecting the conventional view,
mistakenly understood to categorically rule out a role for the courts in
countering corrupt legislation.12
More affirmatively, it will be argued that judicial review of the due process
of lawmaking is required for the same reason that the exclusionary rule exists
in criminal procedure: the possibility of criminal prosecution provides too
little deterrent against the relevant wrongdoing. As we will see,13 the Supreme
Court’s interpretations of the federal bribery statutes, the Speech and Debate
Clause, and the First Amendment have left only a narrow window for the
prosecution of donors and legislators which, even when satisfied, is subject to
prosecutorial discretion, low conviction rates, and, crucially, the survival of
the law enacted with the aid of the bribery in question. Moreover, even
though it will be argued that some of what transpired during the enactment
of the tax law arguably crossed the line into actual bribery, crossing it should
not be the only form of corruption that due process of lawmaking is understood
to protect against, even if cannot encompass all forms. If not only the fact but
the appearance of corruption is a compelling government interest that can
justify limits on political speech, as the Supreme Court has consistently held,14
then a legislative process that gives the reasonable appearance, if not
necessarily the (legal) fact, of bribery is not a legitimate one and should for this
reason be prohibited by due process itself.

11
12

13
14

807–71 (2010) (discussing political safeguards for legislature through judicial review); Ittai BarSimon-Tov, The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the Legislative Process, 91 BOS. U. L. REV. 1915,
1916 (2011) [hereinafter Bar-Simon-Tov, Puzzling Resistance] (“This Article argues for a different
model of judicial review — judicial review of the legislative process.”).
10 U.S. 87 (1810).
See Linde, supra note 9, at 247 (“Seven years after Marbury v. Madison, Marshall, in Fletcher v. Peck,
argued at length why a law once made could not be set aside for having been procured by bribery
and corruption”).
See infra Part II.
E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly highlights some of the
relevant criticism of the recent tax law as the product of a corrupt bargain
between Republican political leaders and hugely wealthy party donors, as
well as of self-dealing, and also surveys the more general current literature
on congressional corruption. Part II explains the limited role of the criminal
law in addressing these problems. Part III first reintroduces Linde’s
conception of the due process of lawmaking that binds federal and state
legislatures, and then proceeds to refine and develop both the content of, and
the constitutional arguments for, this procedural limitation as a response to,
and partial solution of, the problem. Part IV presents the case for judicial
review of the due process of lawmaking, as distinct from (as Linde saw it)
serving as mostly an internal governance rule for legislators. As previewed
above, this case is both affirmative and negative. The affirmative part is
based on an analogy with the exclusionary rule in criminal procedure and
the limited deterrent provided by the prospect of prosecution. It also looks
to the likely comparative effectiveness of judicial and non-judicial
enforcement. The negative part is a reconsideration of the early foundational
case that is usually understood to have set an absolute bar to judicial review
of legislation for corruption. The Article concludes by fleshing out both the
specific targets and the limitations of its core thesis: federal and state statutes
that are enacted by means of an illegitimate procedure violate the
constitutional requirement of due process of lawmaking and should be struck
down by the courts, whether or not that conduct is, or could be, the subject
of a successful prosecution.
I. THE PROBLEM
Recent enactment of the Republican tax law resulted in widespread
critiques of both its process and substance. Passed in a mere seven weeks15
without holding a single evidentiary hearing, through a parliamentary
maneuver that dispensed with the need for any bipartisan support and the
threat of a filibuster in the Senate,16 and with decisive votes held almost
15

16

The bill was introduced into the House on November 2, 2017, received its final vote of approval
on December 20, and was signed into law by the President on December 22, 2017. See Jane C.
Timm, Trump Signs Tax Cut Bill, First Big Legislative Win, NBC NEWS (Dec. 22, 2017, 11:29 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/trump-signs-tax-cut-bill-first-big-legislativewin-n832141 (last updated Dec. 22, 2017, 12:48 PM).
The budget reconciliation procedure was approved by both Houses of Congress in late October 2017.
See Ashley Killough, Budget Narrowly Passes House, a Key Step in Tax Reform, CNN POLITICS,
https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/26/politics/house-budget-vote-tax-reform/index.html
(last
updated Oct. 26, 2017, 3:47 PM).
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before the ink was dry on the final version with no meaningful deliberation,
the process by which the most significant tax legislation since 1986 was
enacted contrasts in almost every respect with that earlier statute.17 For
many critics, the flaws in the procedure and the reluctance to engage in
deliberation or public consideration were directly related to—and an attempt
to hide—its content, which vastly favors the rich at the expense of everyone
else. Reducing the highest federal income tax rate from 39.6 to 37 percent,
cutting the corporate tax rate from 35 to 21 percent, significantly scaling back
the federal estate tax, and not only maintaining, but extending to real estate
profits, the “carried interest loophole” that famously permits Warren Buffet
to pay a lower tax rate than his secretary,18 the action plan seems to have
been to rush this through with the minimum scrutiny and maximum
diversions possible.
In addition to this general reaction to its process and content, a distinct
critique of the law claims that it is also corrupt. It is not simply that the law
favors the rich as a class, but that it is in essence a pay-off to the tiny class of
billionaire Republican donors who fund the party and are critical to it
gaining and maintaining power, as well as in some cases to themselves. In
an op-ed for the San Francisco Chronicle entitled GOP Tax Plan is Triumph of
the American Oligarchs, former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich opined that:
Most Americans know that the tax plan is payback for major American
donors. . . . The giant tax cut has been their core demand from the start. . . .
In return, they have agreed to finance Trump and the GOP and mount
expensive public relations campaigns that magnify their lies. Trump has
fulfilled his end of the bargain. He’s blinded much of his white working-class
base to the reality of what’s happening by means of his racist, xenophobic
rants and policies. The American oligarchs couldn’t care less about what all
of this will cost America.19

17

18
19

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 took over a year to enact from the time the House Ways and Means
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee began holding evidentiary hearings, in which more
than 450 witnesses gave testimony, and was eventually passed with bipartisan input and support, with
only two Democratic Senators voting against the final version of the bill. For details of this process,
see David E. Rosenbaum, The Tax Reform Act of 1986: How the Measure Came Together; A Tax Bill for the
Textbooks, N.Y. TIMES (October 23, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/23/business/taxreform-act-1986-measure-came-together-tax-bill-for-textbooks.html?pagewanted=all (last updated
Nov. 1, 1986).
Warren E. Buffet, Opinion, Stop Coddling the Super-Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/opinion/stop-coddling-the-super-rich.html.
Robert Reich, Opinion, GOP Tax Plan is Triumph of the American Oligarchs, S.F. CHRONICLE (Dec. 21,
2017),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/reich/article/The-triumph-of-the-Americanoligarchs-12442259.php (last updated Dec. 22, 2017, 2:39 PM).
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Similarly, on the day the law passed, Professor Jack Balkin wrote:
[N]ot only are Congressmen and Senators paying off their donors, they are
also paying off themselves. . . . Congress has largely abandoned the goal of
using tax and fiscal policy to further the public interest. . . . Instead, Congress
seeks to pay off a small number of wealthy individuals and groups and
personally enrich sitting Congressmen and Senators.20

Finally in this vein, in a New York Times op-ed entitled Passing Through to
Corruption,21 Paul Krugman argued that:
Some Republicans have been quite open in saying that they felt compelled
to push forward on corporate tax cuts to please their donors. But I’m talking
about more than campaign finance; I’m talking about personal payoffs. . . .
When members of Congress leave their positions, voluntarily or not, their
next jobs often involve lobbying of some kind. This gives them incentive to
keep the big-money guys happy, never mind what voters think.22

Krugman also refers to the “Corker kickback,” an amendment adding
real estate companies to the list of “pass through” businesses whose owners
will get sharply lower tax rates in between the time Senator Corker voted
against the Senate version of the tax bill because it increased the budget
deficit by $1.5 trillion and for the final version of the bill, even though it did
exactly the same.23 Senator Corker owns a real estate company.
All three authors express the expectation, or at least the hope, that in
passing the law, the Republicans and their donors made a major political
mistake because even with all the additional smokescreens and distractions they
will undoubtedly launch between enactment and the 2018 midterm elections,
they could not hide the reality of whom it benefits for that long a time.24

20
21
22
23
24

Jack M. Balkin, The Tax Bill and Constitutional Rot, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 21, 2017),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/12/the-tax-bill-and-constitutional-rot.html.
Paul Krugman, Opinion, Passing Through to Corruption, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/18/opinion/republicans-taxes-corruption.html.
Id.
Id.
Balkin, supra note 20 (“I am hopeful that the public will punish the Republican party for the tax bill in
the coming election cycle.”); Krugman, supra note 21 (“This bill, however, faces heavy disapproval.
Ordinary voters may not be able to parse all the details, but they have figured out that this bill is a
giveaway to corporations and the wealthy that will end up hurting most families. This negative view
isn't likely to change.”); Reich, supra note 19 (“But if polls showing most Americans against the tax cut
are any guide, that triumph may be short-lived. Americans are catching on. . . . A tidal wave of public
loathing is growing across the land. . . . That wave could crash in the midterm elections of 2018. If
so, the current triumph of the oligarchs will be the start of their undoing.”).
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This criticism essentially sees the tax law as a case study in the general
corruption of Congress about which Lawrence Lessig and Zephyr Teachout
have recently written notable books.25 In Republic Lost,26 Lessig distinguishes
between “individual corruption,” or criminal bribery involving quid pro quo
exchanges, and “institutional corruption,” which he defines as the systemic
and distorting dependency of an institution (in the case of Congress, on
campaign funds) that conflicts with its proper and intended role.27 Individual
corruption, which Lessig believes to be rare and involves only the occasional
outlying “bad guy,” can be seen as a debased form or extension of the
dominant “exchange economy” we live in, whereas institutional corruption is
more part of the residual “gift economy,” in which dependency, expectation,
and the pull of relationships are the norm rather than the direct quid pro
quo.28 This latter type of “economy of influence” has distorted its work and
created an institutionally corrupt Congress, which fundamentally undermines
the democratic and republican norm of political equality or equal citizenship.
It is, moreover, this form of corruption (rather than bribery) that the Framers
mostly had in mind in their very significant focus on the issue.29
Zephyr Teachout’s book Corruption in America30 traces the history of a
more demanding and broader conception of corruption that the Framers
deliberately instituted for the United States, and is closely related to the
classical notion of republican virtù.31 Not at all limited to the quid pro quo
exchange, it is exemplified by such bright-line, preemptive rules as the
constitutional ban on public officials receiving gifts from foreign governments
for fear of dependency and interference with their duty to act in the public
interest of the country.32 This dominant conception, reflected not only in
25

26
27
28
29
30

31

32

Balkin also sees it as a further example of “constitutional rot,” the erosion of our constitutional
democracy, which he had previously identified and explored. See Jack Balkin, Constitutional Rot and
Constitutional Crisis, BALKINIZATION (May 15, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/05/
constitutional-rot-and-constitutional.html (distinguishing constitutional crisis from constitutional
rot, and classifying the decay in political norms and institutions under President Trump as
constitutional rot).
LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST, supra note 3.
See id. at 238–39.
Id.
Id. at 236–50.
See TEACHOUT, supra note 3; see also Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 341 (2009) (articulating the uniquely American historical conception of governmental
corruption).
Id. at 40–43. On the concept of republican virtù, see generally NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE
PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES (E.R.P. Vincent ed., Luigi Ricci trans., Carlton House 1900) (1532);
J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE
ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them [the
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numerous other provisions of the Constitution but also in nineteenth and
early twentieth-century anti-corruption laws, as well as in the common law
rule of the non-enforceability of lobbying contracts as against public policy,
has been abandoned by the Supreme Court in recent decades in favor of the
far narrower transactional model of the quid pro quo exchange, in both
criminal law and constitutional free speech contexts.33
Both the specific and general critiques strongly imply that the only
possible effective response, or solution, is a political one. In the case of the
tax law, this would be the ordinary political response of election defeat in
2018, or 2020, and so the chance to amend or repeal the offending tax law.
In the case of more general institutional corruption, Lessig proposes the
solution of, first, a congressional statute to foster far broader participation in
the system of campaign finance, which ought to be upheld against free speech
claims as promoting the compelling interest in fighting the appearance of
(this broader conception of) corruption.34 But a fuller and deeper solution,
he argues, most likely must be in the register of constitutional politics, by
means of one or more constitutional amendments. Because these are unlikely
to be proposed by an institutionally corrupt Congress, it would likely
necessitate the first federal constitutional convention since 1787.35
The major goal of this Article is to suggest that there may also be a legal
response to at least some of this, even under our current constitutional
regime. One part of this legal response, although by far the lesser one, is
through the criminal law. By failing to mention this possibility, the critics are
perhaps too quick to assume that the evidence of actual bribery we have
surrounding the tax bill would not satisfy the Court’s exacting standards
under existing statutes. The primary part, and the part that the remainder
of this Article following Part II focuses on and develops, is through the
existing Constitution. In a nutshell, the Constitution imposes on Congress a
requirement of due process of lawmaking that the surrounding evidence
strongly suggests the tax law violated.

33
34
35

United States], shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument,
Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”). But see Seth
Barrett Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope of Professor Teachout’s Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 NW.
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1 (2012) (arguing, on textualist and originalist grounds, that the Framers
were not as “obsessed” with corruption as Teachout claims and, specifically, that the Emoluments
Clause does not apply to the President or other elected officials, but only to appointed ones).
See TEACHOUT, supra note 3, at 6–9.
Levitt, supra note 5, at 231–32 (describing a proposed internal ethics rule requiring legislators to
recuse themselves from legislative actions benefiting large campaign donors).
LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST, supra note 3, at 39–51.
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II. THE LIMITED ROLE OF CRIMINAL LAW
The role of criminal law in addressing the risk of corruption in Congress
was largely non-existent until after the Second World War.36 As Teachout
explains, the Framers focused on the broader conception of institutional
corruption and the attempt to create structural barriers in a prophylactic or
preemptive strategy to minimize it. To the extent there was a focus on ex post
individual conduct, Congress was initially deemed the appropriate body to
adjudicate and punish corrupt conduct by its members and not the courts,
and later when its members were brought within the scope of relevant
statutes, few prosecutions were initiated.37 This general approach changed
only with the enactment of the Hobbs Act in 194638 to counter extortion on
the part of state and federal officials, including members of Congress, and
then the general federal bribery and gratuities statute in 1962.39
In recent decades, however, the federal courts, including the Supreme
Court, have narrowed the general scope and effectiveness of these laws, but
especially in the campaign contribution context, by creating two key limits.
First, they have effectively implied a near-exception to federal bribery laws
for campaign contributions.40 Although the language of the general federal
bribery statute requires only an “intent . . . to influence any official act”41 on
the part of the briber and that the actual or agreed payment is “in return for
. . . being influenced in the performance of any public act”42 on the part of
the public official, the federal courts have held that Congress could not have
intended this language to include campaign contributions, as otherwise
almost all would fall within it. Accordingly, in United States v. Brewster,43 a case
involving U.S. Senator Daniel Brewster of Maryland, the Federal Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the bribery provision of the
statute requires proof of an explicit quid pro quo. As long as donor and
member of Congress do not expressly attribute the payment to a specific act,
the contribution does not violate the statute.44 In subsequent cases, the

36
37
38
39
40

41
42
43
44

TEACHOUT, supra note 3, at 50, 121–22.
Id. at 120–24.
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994).
18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
Joseph R. Weeks, Bribes, Gratuities and the Congress: The Institutionalized Corruption of the Political Process,
the Impotence of Criminal Law to Reach It, and a Proposal for Change, 13 J. LEGIS. 123, 129 (1986) (“[T]he
courts have interpreted section 201 to provide an implicit exception for campaign contributions.”).
18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1) (1994).
Id. § 201(b)(2)
506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Id. at 72 (“The bribery section makes necessary an explicit quid pro quo.”).
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Supreme Court has affirmed this requirement.45 The Supreme Court itself
applied the same standard to the Hobbs Act in McCormick v. United States,46 a
1991 decision involving alleged extortion of campaign donations by a state
legislator. Only an “explicit promise” to do or refrain from doing an official
act in exchange for the payment violates the statute.47
The second key limit is that the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Speech and Debate Clause of Article I, Section 648 as providing immunity to
members of Congress from criminal prosecution for their prior legislative acts.
More specifically, evidence of legislative votes previously cast is inadmissible
in evidence in a court of law.49 Accordingly, only where evidence of a
legislative vote is not required, as for example where there is relevant evidence
of non-voting legislative or other official acts (such as arranging meetings,
etc.),50 or of an agreement regarding a future legislative vote, will members of
Congress not be shielded from prosecution by this clause.
Despite these significant limitations, it is at least arguable that certain
statements made in the context of the passage of the recent tax law cross the
line from what the Court has deemed legitimate campaign contributions to
illegal ones under these precedents. Take for example, House G.O.P.
member Chris Collins’s candid identification of the “pressure” he was under
to vote for the bill: “My donors are basically saying, ‘Get it [the tax bill] done
or don’t ever call me again.’”51 Senator Lindsey Graham warned that if
Republicans failed to pass the tax plan, “the financial contributions will

45

46
47

48

49

50
51

See, e.g., United States. v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 404, 405 (1999) (describing the
separate gratuity section of statute 18 U.S.C. § 201(c), the Court affirmed that the quid pro quo
requirement applies to the bribery section of the statute only and not to the gratuities).
500 U.S. 257 (1991).
Id. at 273–74 (“[A violation of the Hobbs Act occurs] only if the payments are made in return for
an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act. . . .
We thus disagree with the Court of Appeals’ holding in this case that a quid pro quo is not necessary
for conviction under the Hobbs Act when an official receives a campaign contribution.” (alteration
in original) (footnote omitted)).
“They [Senators and Representatives] shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the
Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses,
and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they
shall not be questioned in any other Place.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
See United States. v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 (1966) (stating that the Speech and Debate privilege
extends to “‘anything generally done in a Session of the House by one of its members in relation to the
business before it [words spoken in debate].” (citing Kilburn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880))).
See, e.g., United States. v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 528 (1972) (holding that evidence of other, nonvoting legislative conduct is not protected under the Speech and Debate Clause).
Cristina Marcos, GOP Lawmaker: Donors Are Pushing Me to Get Tax Reform Done, HILL (Nov. 7, 2017,
11:23 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/359110-gop-lawmaker-donors-are-pushingme-to-get-tax-reform-done.
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stop.”52 For donors, Sean Lansing, former chief operating officer of the Koch
brothers’ political advocacy group Americans for Prosperity, provided a
confirmation: “[i]f they don’t make good on these promises [for tax reform]
. . . there are going to be consequences, and quite frankly there should be.”53
This unusually direct evidence of paying or threatening to withhold money
for votes on the tax bill, and of legislators’ motivation, may well satisfy the
narrow window that the Supreme Court has left for successful prosecutions
under the relevant federal law. Essentially, as we have seen, what it takes to
push our ordinary campaign finance system, which has been characterized as
“legalized bribery,” over the line into the illegal, is proof of an explicit quid pro
quo exchange of contribution for a particular future legislative vote. It seems
naive to understand these statements in any other way.
Of course, even if the line was crossed, whether such prosecutions will be
brought or would succeed is another matter.54 Somewhat curiously, to the
best of my knowledge, no one—not even the critics of the tax law quoted
above—has even suggested they could be. But the major point of this Article
is to suggest that whether or not criminal prosecution is in order, there is an
alternative legal response to the problem highlighted by the tax law: the
process by which it was enacted falls below the minimum standards of
legitimacy set by the Constitution.

52

53

54

Rebecca Savransky, Graham: ‘Financial Contributions Will Stop’ if GOP Doesn’t Pass Tax Reform, HILL
(Nov. 9, 2017, 11:32 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/359606-graham-financialcontributions-will-stop-if-gop-doesnt-pass-tax-reform.
Koch Brothers’ Political Network Will Spend Between $300 and $400 Million on 2018, CBS NEWS (June 26,
2017, 7:42 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/koch-brothers-political-network-will-spendbetween-300-and-400-million-on-2018/.
See infra text accompanying notes 100–01 for an explanation of the possible reasons.
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III. THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DUE PROCESS OF
LAWMAKING
A. The Core Principle
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have
long been held to apply to federal and state legislatures, and not only to
judiciaries and executives. Obviously the “substantive” component of due
process—which first arose in the late 1880s,55 appeared to have been killed
off after 1937, but has been revived in its modern, privacy/autonomy-based
version since the 1960s56—is primarily a constitutional limit on the output of
legislatures in particular. But even before the first era of substantive due
process, the Supreme Court had held that procedural due process applied to
Congress.57
Hans Linde’s classic article Due Process of Lawmaking,58 published eleven
years after the revival of substantive due process in Griswold v. Connecticut59
and three after its controversial extension in Roe v. Wade,60 was first and
foremost a critique of this recent development in favor of an understanding
of due process as being exclusively about procedure. It makes three main
claims. First, occupying approximately the first two-thirds of its content and
serving as its primary focus, the entire doctrine of substantive due process
was and is a mistake, including in particular its “rational basis review”
component, which demands of any piece of legislation that it is rationally
related to a legitimate government interest. Linde critiques the notion that
under due process, legislation must be substantively reasonable or rational
from a variety of perspectives, including the textual, originalist,
psychological, and practical.61

55

56
57

58
59
60
61

See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 62 (1905) (striking down state labor laws on substantive
due process grounds); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897) (invalidating—for the first
time—a state law on substantive due process grounds); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660, 661
(1887) (stating that the Court is prepared to examine the substantive reasonableness of state legislation).
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (reviving substantive due process doctrine in
respect to the use of contraceptives).
See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1855) (“The . . .
[Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment] is a restraint on the legislative as well as the executive
and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress free to
make any process ‘due process of law,’ by its mere will.”).
See Linde, supra note 9.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
Linde, supra note 9, at 201–35.
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Second, due process is rather to be understood as exclusively concerned
with the procedures by which the government acts, and not the reasons for
which it does. Since all branches of the federal government are subject to
the requirements of the Fifth Amendment, this means that Congress is
constitutionally required to observe due process in lawmaking. In posing the
question of what due process of law means in the lawmaking context, Linde
answers as follows: “[The] government is not to take life, liberty, or property
under color of laws that were not made according to a legitimate law-making
process.”62 Although he provides neither a list of which lawmaking processes
are legitimate and which are not, nor a methodology for applying this
standard, he writes that this question is the proper focus of attention and that
“[d]ue process of lawmaking will include some but not all of the rules
[constitutional, statutory, internal, etc.] governing the particular lawmaking
body.”63 He does give the example of bribery as an obvious instance of an
illegitimate process that violates due process of lawmaking,64 or “what the
Constitution demands of lawmakers.”65
Third, turning to the issue of what enforcement and remedy applies to
such violations, Linde is somewhat opaque and equivocal, as a major theme
of his article is the conception of constitutional law as a set of directives for
the conduct of government rather than as the basis for judicial review, with
which he believes constitutional scholarship has become overly obsessed.66
His seeming skepticism about judicial enforcement of the due process of
lawmaking is partly based on precedent, in that he cites Fletcher v. Peck as
having categorically ruled out judicial review of legislation for corruption.67
To the extent Linde did oppose, or at least wish to minimize, judicial
review of the due process of lawmaking, I take up the reasons for my
disagreement with him in the following Part. In the remainder of this Part,
I simply express my agnosticism for the purposes of this Article about the
primary target of his critique, the doctrine of substantive due process
underlying the “rational basis” requirement, and focus on his second claim
by further exploring and developing the thesis that due process “provide[s] a
constitutional standard below which no lawmaking process may fall.”68
62
63
64
65
66

67
68

Id. at 239 (alteration in original).
Id. at 245 (alteration in original).
Id. at 248.
Id. at 243.
Indeed, perhaps his major critique of the substantive conception of due process as requiring laws
to be a rational means to a legitimate end is that, whether or not it works as a standard for judicial
review, it cannot serve as a constitutional directive to lawmakers.
See supra note 12.
Linde, supra note 9, at 245.
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More generally, although to be sure not without internal and external
contestation, the Supreme Court has long understood the concept of due
process of law to provide limits on government actions, or individual rights,
that are independent of those contained in more specific provisions of the
Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.69 As part and parcel of the distinct
concept of due process, these independent limits can be—and are—both
more and less than specific textual ones. So, until the Warren Court
“incorporated” almost all of the specific provisions in the Bill of Rights
against the states, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause was held
to encompass significantly less than these provisions.70 Even now, due
process does not entail the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil
cases over $20, the Fifth Amendment right to indictment by grand jury only,
or the Third Amendment right against the quartering of soldiers in
peacetime.71 Conversely, the right to due process against both federal and
state governments has been held to include more than the specific textual
provisions, both in terms of such “substantive” rights as the use of
contraceptives, abortion, and same-sex marriage,72 as well as certain
procedural rights in the criminal or civil litigation context. Examples are the
prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence under the Brady doctrine73
and the void for vagueness principle in criminal law.74
Due process of lawmaking, as part of the general requirement of due
process binding all branches of federal and state governments, can and should
be understood in the same way. That is, the concept of due process of
69

70

71
72

73
74

Starting with Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908) (“If . . . some of the personal rights
safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against
state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law. . . . [i]t is not because
those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but because they are of such a nature
that they are included in the conception of due process.”).
See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54 (1947) (holding that due process does not include
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 322
(1937) (holding that due process does not include Fifth Amendment right against double jeopardy).
See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 470 (19th ed. 2016).
See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2071 (2015) (holding the right to due process includes
the right to same-sex marriage); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (holding that the right to
due process includes the right to have an abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(holding that the right to due process includes the right to access contraception).
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
See, e.g., Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 393 (1926) (holding that due process is violated
where a criminal statute does not clearly indicate the crime and its elements). Another possible
example is the exclusionary rule in criminal procedure, which Richard Re has argued should
properly be understood as an independent requirement of due process rather than, as generally
viewed by the Court, a prophylactic rule preventing violations of the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. See Richard Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule,
127 HARV. L. REV. 1885, 1907 (2014).
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lawmaking is an independent and potentially additional requirement on
Congress (as well as state legislatures). It is neither limited to the extremely
brief textual provisions dealing with the legislative process in Congress in
Article I, section 775 nor foreclosed by Article I, section 5, clause 2’s
empowering of each House to establish its Rules of Proceedings.76 Just as due
process can and does impose constitutional requirements beyond those in the
Bill of Rights, so too it can and does impose constitutional requirements
beyond those contained in the text of Article I. Moreover, whereas in the Bill
of Rights context, many (although not all77) of these additional requirements
have been “substantive” in nature, and partly contested for that reason, the
additional requirements of due process of lawmaking placed on Congress are
clearly and exclusively procedural in nature.
Let me give two concrete examples to illustrate this abstractly-stated
argument. Imagine the following hypothetical based very loosely on the
circumstances surrounding passage of the recent tax law. The majority party
in both Houses of Congress has determined that it is politically essential for
a tax law to be passed within a very short, pre-determined period (“by
Christmas”), and that passing virtually any tax law is better than not passing
one at all. By using a certain parliamentary tactic, the majority party has
sufficient votes by itself to pass the law without the support of any member
of the minority party. However, when the bill is in conference committee,
the majority party members are deadlocked between two different versions
and simply cannot agree among themselves to support one rather than the
other.78 After exhausting all arguments, the committee chair suggests tossing
a coin to resolve the deadlock and all members of the majority party agree
that they will support version A or B depending on the toss. (Or imagine the
same thing happening when the bill returns to the full Senate and House
after the majority party committee members votes for A over B by one vote.)
Version A of the bill wins the coin toss, is supported by all majority party
members per the agreement, and narrowly squeaks though the final votes to
be signed by the triumphant President within the textually specified ten-day
75

76
77
78

In their entirety, these provisions are: “[1] All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House
of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills. [2]
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it
become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States [continues with procedure for
presidential signing, veto, and congressional override].” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1, 2.
“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
Assuming there is an odd number of majority party members, imagine one of them abstains and
the others are equally divided on the two versions.
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period. Let’s stipulate that the resulting law meets the substantive standard
of minimal reasonableness/non-arbitrariness under the due process “rational
basis test” that Linde abhors. Is there any constitutional problem with the
lawmaking process? Although it appears to satisfy the sparse textual
requirements of Article I, in that it has “passed” both Houses of Congress,
surely the answer is yes. The obvious problem is that Congress did not use a
legitimate process in passing the law. In short, Congress failed to engage in
due process of lawmaking.79
A second hypothetical comes closer to some of the critiques of the tax
law referenced above and also to Linde’s own example of an obviously
illegitimate lawmaking procedure. Imagine that the final Senate vote on the
tax bill was 50-50, with the Vice President breaking the tie in favor of the
bill. It subsequently transpires that one senator who had previously
announced he was not running for re-election and who had expressed severe
doubts about the bill because it significantly increased the budget deficit but
in the end voted in favor of it, did so in exchange for a ten million dollar
payment (or the promise of a lucrative job) from a real estate developer who
stood to gain much more from the law’s provisions. The senator and the
developer are both convicted of bribery under the relevant federal statute.80
Is there any constitutional problem with the lawmaking process? Once
again, the requirements of Article I appear to have been met but the obvious
problem is that the law was enacted by means of a paradigmatically
illegitimate process. Due process of lawmaking was not respected.
Accordingly, it seems reasonably clear that, as far as Congress is
concerned, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains an
independent and supplementary requirement of due process of lawmaking
above and beyond the very brief textual provisions on its role in the legislative
process in Article I.81 This requirement imposes constitutional minimum
standards of legitimacy for the processes by which Congress “passes” bills
before they are sent to the President, and this is so whether or not such
standards are reflected in each House’s Rules of Proceedings authorized by
79

80

81

This example is not intended to deny that in some other (non-deliberative) contexts, including
military drafts, rotation of office holding in direct democracies, sports matches, and perhaps judicial
case selection (but not decision), the randomness of the coin toss or lottery is a fair and justifiable
procedure. On this latter example, see Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1, 47–52 (2009).
Let’s stipulate that the Senator’s conviction survives a Speech and Debate Clause immunity claim.
The Speech and Debate Clause states that, “[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators
and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
See supra note 75. The role of the president in the context of the veto, as well as that of Congress in
response to a presidential veto, are more fully the focus of the text, taking up approximately ninety
percent of the wording in Article I, Section 7, the only provision dealing with the lawmaking process.
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Article I, section 5. Even if the Senate’s Rules were to permit coin tosses or
bribery, laws enacted as a result would still violate due process.
B. The Scope and Extension of Due Process of Lawmaking
Having, I hope, established the core principle and requirement of due
process of lawmaking as independent of, and additional to, the provisions of
Article I, the question naturally arises as to its extension and scope. What
else, apart from a coin toss and criminal bribery that was essential to the
enactment of a law, would violate this duty? In terms of bribery, is such a
criminal conviction necessary or would the conduct itself be sufficient even
without conviction, or even prosecution—perhaps because it is deemed
covered by the Speech and Debate Clause immunity? Must the bribery have
been a “but for” cause of the law’s enactment? If not, does any such conduct,
even by a single member among an overwhelming majority for a bill, render
the legislative process illegitimate? Is it only conduct amounting to criminal
bribery that violates the duty or are any other, broader forms of corruption
included? And moving beyond corruption, what other procedural flaws in
the enactment of a bill would render the process constitutionally illegitimate?
What if no notice of a bill’s contents is provided to ordinary House members
before a definitive vote? What if Senate rules were to delegate to a committee
the power to make subsequent changes to its content after the “final” vote?
As with Linde’s own response to the issue of what constitutes a legitimate
process, I think these are the right questions to ask, once the core requirement
is established. The major goal of this Article is to revisit and solidify its
establishment, especially in light of the subsequent massive increases in the
amount of money in politics and the seemingly ever stronger arm tactics of
elite donors. Nonetheless, although the task of systematically working out
the full application and implications of the requirement of due process of
lawmaking is one that must be left to future work, let me at least begin to
address the corruption-related questions.
As an independent constitutional limit on Congress, the requirements of
due process are not necessarily coextensive with the provisions of the criminal
law as it happens to be enacted and interpreted at any given time. As such,
due process is an essential rather than a contingent principle, until amended,
and historically predates the existence of any relevant criminal law in this
area. For the same reason, a violation of due process of lawmaking for
bribery or any other form of included corruption is not dependent on
criminal conviction or prosecution. The (independent) question is what is a
minimally legitimate lawmaking process; what process is constitutionally due
for enacting legislation. Whether or not, for example, the statements of
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lawmakers and donors quoted above82 would amount to sufficient evidence
of a quid pro quo exchange under the federal criminal bribery statute, they
should be understood as fatally tainting the legislative process as illegitimate
for constitutional purposes. Even if, or just because, conduct may fall short
of criminal bribery, this does not mean it is “OK,” or legitimate, for due
process of lawmaking purposes. On the other hand, however deeply
problematic our “ordinary” system of campaign finance—in which
donations are more routinely exchanged for influence and/or access—
undoubtedly is from a variety of perspectives, including the republican and
equality of citizenship ones voiced by Lessig and Teachout, it does not rise
to the same level of illegitimacy so as to call into question the entire modern
process of lawmaking. In other words, from the perspective of “due”
legislative process, there was something out of the ordinary and particularly
egregious about the enactment of the tax law, as evidenced by both the
reactions to it and the unusually candid statements quoted in Parts I and II
above. This “something” is perhaps encapsulated as follows: influence and
access are one thing, but undue influence and access are another.
Is there a standard that captures this distinction between “ordinary” and
“undue” influence on the one hand, but does not necessarily require
satisfying the current criminal criterion of the explicit quid pro quo or express
promise on the other? The affirmative answer I would like to suggest is
twofold: the implied promise and the specific threat of withholding. An
implied promise lies in between an overt or explicit agreement to exchange
money for a particular legislative vote and the mere expectation of a return
favor arising from a gift. Where an understanding between donor and
legislator that creates an (obviously non-legally binding) obligation—take my
money and vote for the bill—can be reasonably inferred from the
circumstances, then this is also the sort of conduct that potentially83 renders
the legislative process constitutionally illegitimate. Even where an
understanding cannot be said to create an obligation, but nonetheless
involves a specific threat of withholding donations—if you do not vote for
Bill X, say goodbye to any future contributions—this too bespeaks
illegitimacy of process, despite the fact that donations are obviously voluntary
and within the discretion of the donor to bestow in the first place.
In the context of Congress’s power to limit constitutionally protected
political speech that takes the form of campaign contributions or
expenditures, the Supreme Court has long held that there is a compelling
82
83

See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
That is, if the other conditions are met.
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governmental interest in combating not only the fact of corruption but also its
appearance.84 Although (1) the Court has narrowed the conception of
corruption to quid pro quo exchange in this context too85 and (2) like the
criminal bribery context, this First Amendment one is also different from the
independent constitutional due process issue, this second recognized interest
may be a plausible perspective to adopt. That is, whether or not there is
evidence of conduct that would amount to actual bribery in either the
criminal or free speech contexts, any conduct that reasonably gives rise to the
appearance of corruption, to the type of undue influence and access arguably
evidenced during enactment of the tax bill, including the implied promise and
the specific threat of withholding, renders the process constitutionally
illegitimate under the Due Process Clause. Even questionably or borderline
lawful conduct may create the appearance of the type of corruption that
amounts to undue legislative process. It bears emphasizing that contrary to
the Court’s express holding in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,86 this
type of undue influence and appearance of corruption can result from
“independent” expenditures. Whether the source of the money in question is
super PACs, other expenditures independent of campaigns themselves, or
direct contributions, the threats to withhold funds and their effects on the
legislators and the legislative process would be the same.
Finally, and to address one of the (not necessarily insuperable) difficulties
mentioned by Chief Justice Marshall in his majority opinion in Fletcher v.
Peck,87 the conduct giving rise to the illegitimacy of the process need not be a
“but for” cause of either the passing of the legislation as a whole or the
individual member’s vote. On the former, the reason is that, especially if
appearance of corruption is the relevant standard, even if the pressure from
donors is not a strictly essential condition of the legislation passing, the
process is still fatally tainted for constitutional purposes; the process is still an
illegitimate—if not necessarily an (independently) unlawful—one. On the
other hand, however, even criminal bribery by a single member that had no
discernible effect on the content of a bill or the likelihood of its enactment
probably would be insufficient. The conduct in question must at least give
the appearance of having a significant impact on Congress’s collective work
product to taint the process as constitutionally illegitimate, even if it cannot
be specifically proven that but for the conduct it would not have passed.
84
85
86
87

See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47–49 (1976) (discussing how independent expenditure ceilings
burden First Amendment expression).
See id. at 45 (discussing large independent expenditures in relation to a quid pro quo exchange).
558 U.S. 310, 357, 360 (2010) (holding, inter alia, that independent political expenditures, by
definition, cannot corrupt or have the appearance of corruption).
See infra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
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From the perspective of the individual member of Congress, the same
constitutional test should be employed as is used in the context of “raceneutral” government measures under the Equal Protection Clause: the
concerns about continuing campaign contributions need only be a
motivating factor in voting, and not necessarily the sole or dominant one.
Indeed, as in the equal protection context, this test may be applied to the
legislation as a whole: were concerns about campaign donations a motivating
factor in the enactment of the law?88
In sum, due process of lawmaking is violated not only by acts currently
constituting criminal bribery, but also by conduct that reasonably gives the
appearance of bribery so as to taint the legitimacy of the process. This includes
an implied promise of money for a specific vote and the threat of discontinuing
payments if such a specific vote is not forthcoming. The type of conduct
evidenced by the quoted statements concerning the tax bill above89 may well
fall under either category, without also including the type of ordinary, run of
the mill, “institutional corruption” of our general system of campaign finance.
This, I believe, is consistent with and helps to explain the unusually strong
reaction to this aspect of the process of enacting the tax law, which reflected
more than the “usual business” of Congress. At the same time, due process
requires neither criminal conviction or prosecution nor proof that the
illegitimate process was an essential, but for, cause of the law’s enactment. If
it appears to have had a discernible impact on the likelihood of passage and
was at least a motivating factor in the votes of legislators, this is sufficient.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DUE PROCESS OF LAWMAKING
Establishing that there is a constitutional requirement of due process of
lawmaking and the general contours of its content does not necessarily
determine how it is to be enforced or violations remedied. Analytically, these
are of course two distinct issues, as they always are with respect to any
constitutional provision, and were, for example, famously treated as such in
Marbury v. Madison.90 In terms of comparative practice also, there is a variety
of answers to what the remedial implications of a rule, practice or norm being
deemed “constitutional” are.
For example, in the Netherlands,
constitutional rights contained in the country’s bill of rights bind the
legislature but are not enforceable by the courts, which generally lack the
88
89
90

See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 148 (1803) (separating the questions of whether Section 13 of the 1789
Judiciary Act conflicted with the Constitution, and whether the courts should nonetheless apply it).
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power of judicial review of legislation.91 In the United Kingdom, the
appellation “constitutional” applied to a statute or convention typically
substantially raises the political costs of repeal or violation but does not
trigger judicial enforcement. This said, it is fair to say that, at least since the
“canonization” of Marbury, the general norm and presumption in the United
States is that constitutional limitations placed on the political branches are
judicially enforceable, with specific exceptions in cases of non-justiciability
and political questions.
Neither of these two exceptions applies to judicial enforcement of the due
process of lawmaking. Although provisional, the discussion of what conduct
triggers illegitimacy in the lawmaking process in Part III above was informed
by the need to provide judicially manageable standards. To recap, in
addition to the most egregious and clear cases of illegitimacy, such as the coin
toss and criminal bribery that was essential to the enactment of a law, an
implied promise of money and a threat to discontinue funding surrounding
a specific legislative vote will violate due process as giving rise to the
appearance of undue influence, where it has a discernible impact on a bill’s
likelihood of enactment and there is evidence it was a motivating factor in
legislators’ support for it.
Similarly, whether an illegitimate procedure for due process purposes is
employed in the enactment of a law is not an issue that the Constitution leaves
to the political branches, so as to be a “political question.” The fact that
Article I empowers Congress to establish its rules of proceedings does not
mean or imply that there are no constitutional restrictions on the content of
such rules nor that Congress is the final judge of the constitutionality of any
of its procedures.92 For example, Article III empowers Congress to set rules
for the jurisdiction of the federal courts, but ever since Marbury struck down
one such rule as unconstitutional,93 it has been understood that this power is
subject to the rest of the Constitution and judicial review. And although it
may be understandable that courts would prefer to shy away from such a
responsibility, this is not thought to be a sufficient justification for use of the
91

92

93

BOEKJE GRONDWET [Constitution] Sept. 22, 2008, art. 120 (Neth.) (“[T]he constitutionality of
Acts of Parliament and treaties shall not be reviewed by the courts.”). Despite this “domestic”
constitutional rule, Dutch courts, like courts in all member-states, are obligated under European
Union law not to apply national law that conflicts with it.
See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1855) (“The . . .
[Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment] is a restraint on the legislative as well as the executive
and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave Congress free to
make any process ‘due process of law,’ by its mere will.”).
This was the rule contained in Section 13 of the 1789 Judiciary Act, interpreted by Chief Justice
Marshall to unconstitutionally expand the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
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political question doctrine, especially where here, unlike say with separation
of powers issues, the checking function of institutional competition behind a
political resolution of an issue may be completely lacking due to single party
control of both the White House and Congress. Finally, if the Constitution
sets minimum standards below which legislative process may not fall, then it
no more violates broader separation of powers values for the courts to enforce
them than for any constitutional limit on legislative outputs, and perhaps less.
This is because procedural review far more rarely than substantive review, if
ever, leaves a legislature constitutionally disabled from acting.94
If justiciability and the political question doctrine do not rule out judicial
review of the due process of lawmaking, as I have argued, then neither does
the early precedent of Fletcher v. Peck, as many, including Linde, seem to
believe.95 Fletcher is a seminal Marshall Court decision best known as the first
occasion on which the Supreme Court invalidated a state law as
unconstitutional. Both its facts and constitutional claims are unusual,
perhaps even sui generis, which is part of why I believe the Court’s decision
does not stand for such a general proposition as a categorical bar.
Accordingly, they bear brief summary.96
The case involved the fallout from the new nation’s first massive financial
scandal: Yazoo.97 A consortium of land speculation companies called the
“Combined Society,” led by Patrick Henry of “give me liberty” fame,
attempted to purchase thirty-five million acres of land situated close to the
Yazoo River on the cheap from the state of Georgia. Georgia claimed, but
did not control, all of the land, which it had appropriated from several Native
American tribes. Aided by an arrangement in which the companies had
made every member of the legislature who voted for the sale except one a
shareholder in the purchases, the Georgia legislature in 1795 passed a land
grant bill accepting the companies’ offer of $250,000, but it was vetoed by
the Governor. A second bill, incorporating a new bid of $500,000, was then
passed and accepted. When news of the “greatest real estate deal in
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See Bar-Siman-Tov, Puzzling Resistance, supra note 10, at 1954–58 (“[I]n contrast to strong-form
substantive judicial review, JLRP [judicial review of the legislative process] is perfectly compatible
with legislative reenactment of invalidated statutes.”).
See Linde, supra note 9, at 247 (discussing Marshall’s opinion in Fletcher regarding judicial review).
See generally TEACHOUT, supra note 3, at 83–94.
For historical scholarship on the scandal, see generally C. PETER MCGRATH, YAZOO: LAW AND
POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC: THE CASE OF FLETCHER V. PECK (1966). See also JOHN T.
NOONAN, JR., BRIBES: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF A MORAL IDEA 435–42 (1984); Tracy
Jenkins, Conflict of Interest in the Yazoo Affair, 3 JAMES BLAIR HIST. REV. 49 (2012) (“[T]he Yazoo sale
[turned] into the first major nationally-important scandal in the United States . . . .”).
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history”98 emerged, the public was outraged and in the election the following
year every legislator who voted for it was thrown out. A committee of the
new “anti-Yazoo” legislature quickly concluded that the law had been
fraudulently passed and the full body enacted a new statute, the Rescinding
Act, revoking the 1795 land grant. In defiance of this second law, however,
the Yazoo companies continued to sell parcels of the land throughout the
country, and their uncertain legal status together with the surrounding
circumstances converted the matter from a regional into a national scandal.
President Thomas Jefferson appointed a commission that included James
Madison, which, due to continuing political opposition to bailing out land
speculators, only in 1814 resulted in federal legislation offering a compromise
solution between the full legal title and no legal title claims of the opposing
camps and parties: the federal government would offer to buy the land from
purchasers at a reduced price.99
In 1800, John Peck, a citizen of Massachusetts, had acquired a parcel of
the Yazoo land and sold it to Robert Fletcher, a citizen of New Hampshire,
in 1803. The case arose when Fletcher sought to have the sale voided in
federal court by claiming breach of contract on the basis that Peck’s covenant
of a legal right to sell the land was false: either because the 1795 land grant
was corrupt and so invalid in the first place or the1796 law had legally
revoked it. There was speculation at the time, as evidenced by both oral
argument and the opinion of Justice Johnson,100 that Fletcher was put up to
the task in order to bring a test case before a potentially sympathetic,
property rights-oriented, Federalist-dominated Court.
The Court unanimously held that the 1796 Rescinding Act was
unconstitutional. For the majority, this was because it violated the Contracts
Clause of Article I, Section 10, and perhaps also the ex post facto clause,
given that many prior contracts for the sale of the land under the 1795 grant
had already been executed.101 For Justice Johnson, writing separately, it was
because the law violated a more general unwritten principle that
governments cannot undo contracts at will, even though he interpreted the
Contracts Clause itself as narrower in scope than the majority and as not
98
99
100
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ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL: CONFLICT AND CONSTRUCTION, 1800–
1815, at 551 (1919).
Ch. 39, 3 Stat. 116 (1814).
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147–48 (1810) (dissenting Justice Johnson wrote that he
has “been very unwilling to proceed to the decision of this cause at all. It appears to me to bear
strong evidence . . . of being a mere feigned case.”) (Johnson, J., dissenting); see also TEACHOUT
supra note 3, at 89–90 (stating that “Justice Marshall scolded Joseph Story (Fletcher’s attorney) for
representing a case that was ‘manifestly made up’”).
Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 137–40 (majority opinion).
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covering this case.102
On Fletcher’s prior claim that the 1795 Act should be invalidated based
on the legislators’ corrupt conduct, the majority opinion, written by Chief
Justice Marshall, held that the procedural posture of the case—a private law
contract dispute between two individuals—rendered it inappropriate to
examine such a “solemn question” in what in this context was a “collateral
and incidental” claim.103 This is especially the case, Marshall added, where,
as here, the Court is asked to nullify a law based on allegations of legislators’
conduct about which the many subsequent purchasers of the land would
have had no knowledge or notice.104 Unraveling the chain of prior, good
faith transactions among innocent buyers and sellers, as Fletcher’s claim
effectively seeks, would, according to Marshall (and the general pro-Yazoo
argument with which Federalists were sympathetic), violate principles of
equity and undermine private property rights.105 Accordingly, the Court
does not rule out reviewing the corruption claim in a more propitious setting,
as for example, where the state is a party to the case.
It is true that before declining to reach the merits of this claim here,
Marshall expressed skepticism about the general issue of judicial review of
statutes for corruption, but he did not address it sufficiently to provide a definite
answer. What he did was identify certain practical “difficulties” involved:
If the principle be conceded, that an act of the supreme sovereign power
might be declared null by a court, in consequence of the [corrupt] means
which procured it, still would there be much difficulty in saying to what
extent those means must be applied to produce this effect. Must it be direct
corruption, or would interest undue influence of any kind be sufficient?
Must the vitiating cause operate on a majority, or on what number of the
members?106

He also voiced familiar concerns about how far the validity of a law depends
on the motives of its framers and whether courts should examine them,
concerns that have not prevented the Court from doing just this in several
modern contexts.107
102
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Id. at 144–45 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 131 (“[t]his solemn question cannot be brought thus collaterally and incidentally before the
court.”).
Given the depth of the scandal, one may well wonder whether this is accurate.
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 132–33 (1810).
Id. at 130.
Most prominently in the context of race discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, where the
Court has described the “basic equal protection principle [to be] that the invidious quality of a law
claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.”
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). More specifically, in the context of “race- neutral”
laws, a plaintiff must show that “a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision
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It is rather Justice Johnson’s dissenting opinion,108 and not the majority,
that takes a more definitive or categorical position on the general issue of
judicial review of legislation for corruption; that is, whether or not such a
claim is raised in the specific context of vested rights. He wrote:
As to the idea that the grants of a legislature may be void because the
legislator are corrupt, it appears to me to be subject to insuperable
difficulties. The acts of the supreme power of a country must be considered
pure for the same reason that all sovereign acts must be considered just -because there is no power that can declare them otherwise.109

He went on to suggest that prosecution for bribery is a preferable alternative,
which is more suited to judicial enforcement.110 Presumably, Johnson only
took the trouble to address this issue in his opinion because he saw some
difference between his and the majority’s position on it. Perhaps this was the
difference between “difficulties” and “insuperable difficulties.”
Thus far, I have presented reasons why judicial review is not ruled out
by either non-justiciability doctrines or precedent. The affirmative case for
judicial review of legislation for corruption on the basis that it violates the
due process of lawmaking is based on an analogy with the exclusionary rule
in criminal procedure. Indeed, in this respect, it is not coincidental that some
scholars view the exclusionary rule as an implication of due process.111 For
that part of the due process of lawmaking which is more or less co-extensive
with criminal bribery under federal statutes, the analogy is as follows: Just as
evidence gained as the result of an illegal search is excluded from trial, so too
should legislation resulting from illegal bribery be excluded from the statute
book. In both cases, the product of the illegal act is fatally tainted by the
illegality. The exclusionary rule exists because relying exclusively on the
prosecution of police officers for illegal searches is not thought to provide
sufficient deterrent or protection against the harm. This same reasoning
applies, perhaps even more strongly, to laws that are enacted as the result of
bribery. Contrary to Justice Johnson’s stated view in his Fletcher dissent,112
the prospect of being prosecuted for bribery provides too little deterrent to
donors or members of Congress, and so does not adequately protect the
integrity of the legislative process.
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[being challenged].” Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
Justice Johnson’s primary dissent from Marshall’s opinion in the case was his rejection of the
majority’s position that the State of Georgia had acquired fee simple title to the land at the time of
the 1795 land grant. He argued that it still lawfully belonged to the Native American tribes from
which Georgia had appropriated it. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 144 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 144 (1810) (Johnson, J., dissenting)
Id.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
See Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 144–45.
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Let me explain why. First, as discussed in Part II above, the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the relevant federal bribery laws has left only a
narrow window for successful prosecutions. This is especially the case where
the “payment” is in the form of campaign contributions, as arguably with the
tax law, for here the statute has been read in light of the Court’s protection
of political donations as a form of speech under the First Amendment. To
recap: essentially, what it takes to push our ordinary campaign finance
system, which has frequently been characterized as “legalized bribery,” over
the line into the illegal, is proof of a quid pro quo exchange of contribution
for a particular future legislative vote. Although, again, this is arguably just
what happened in the case of the tax law, for it seems naive to understand
the types of statements cited above in any other way, this is what makes it so
unusual and created the exceptionally strong reaction to the process.
Second, whether such indictments are sought, given both the sort of
general prosecutorial discretion that saw few “big fish” prosecuted during
and after the financial crisis of 2008 and the potential undermining of
prosecutorial independence at the outset of the Trump administration, when
forty-six U.S. Attorneys were fired,113 is another matter. For one thing,
prosecutors may be hampered and influenced by the same political pressures
that result in legislative due process violations in the first place. Third, again
as we have seen, the Court has interpreted the Speech and Debate Clause of
Article I Section 6 as conferring immunity from prosecution on members of
Congress for any prior legislative votes that they have cast. Fourth, the track
record of recent corruption cases suggests that, even where prosecuted,
convictions are far from certain.114 Finally, even with a conviction, any
113
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Charlie Savage & Maggie Haberman, Trump Abruptly Orders 46 Obama-Era Prosecutors to Resign, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/us/politics/us-attorney-justicedepartment-trump.html.
The last three sitting U.S. Senators to have been indicted on corruption charges were either
acquitted or had their convictions overturned on appeal: Robert Menendez (2017), acquitted; Ted
Stevens (2008), overturned; Kay Bailey Hutchinson (1993), acquitted. See Terence Samuel, There
Have Been 12 U.S. Senators Indicted While in Office. Here’s a List., WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/04/02/there-have-been-12-u-ssenators-indicted-while-in-office-heres-a-list/?utm_term=.4ba95c3a19b9. In addition, two other
prominent politicians, former Virginia Governor Robert McDonnell and former Speaker of the
New York Assembly Sheldon Silver, had their corruption convictions overturned in 2016 and 2017
respectively, although Silver was subsequently convicted again at his retrial in May 2018. See
Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Overturns Corruption Conviction of Former Va. Governor McDonnell, WASH.
POST (June 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-rulesunanimously-in-favor-of-former-va-robert-f-mcdonnell-in-corruptioncase/2016/06/27/38526a94-3c75-11e6-a66f-aa6c1883b6b1_story.html;
Benjamin
Weiser,
Sheldon Silver, Ex-New York Assembly Speaker, Gets 7-Year Prison Sentence, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/27/nyregion/sheldon-silver-sentencing-prison-
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individual sentences handed down are typically vastly outweighed by the
donors’ collective return on “investment.” For the law, like the recent tax
law that so directly and disproportionately benefits them, still remains.
Accordingly, judicial review to set aside laws that were enacted with the
“help” of this type of illegitimate process may be the only effective way to
alter these incentives and create sufficient protection against abuse.115
Obviously, however, even such limited threats of prosecution will not
deter forms of corruption of the legislative process that are not within the
current scope of the criminal law. Here, by necessity, if we want to protect
against, and reduce the incentives to engage in, such conduct, an alternative
mechanism is required. Since I have argued above that due process of
lawmaking should be understood to encompass the reasonable appearance
of certain forms of corruption and the illegitimacy of the legislative process
and not only criminal bribery, judicial review of the resulting legislation is
such a mechanism of protection, and perhaps the only one. Buying influence
and access may be protected political speech, but buying undue influence
creates at least the appearance of constitutionally illegitimate lawmaking
procedures.
Although undoubtedly less common than judicial oversight of legislative
outputs, there is an emerging trend around the world for courts to review
legislative processes, primarily in response to the near-universal sense of a
decline in how they operate compared with how they are supposed to,
particularly in the quality and quantity of meaningful deliberation about the
public interest.116 This trend belies the notion that matters of legislative
process are inherently political questions and so not suitable for judicial
review. While elsewhere the causes of this perceived decline may be more
varied and somewhat less attributable to the distortion resulting from the role
of campaign contributions, the growing role of constitutional courts
worldwide represents a common judicial attempt to reverse it. For example,
in a series of cases starting in 2012, the South African Constitutional Court
has engaged in robust review of several types of legislative procedures, not
only the lawmaking process itself but also internal parliamentary rules and
mechanisms for the conduct of its business, including finding them in
violation of the constitutional rights of individual members.117 These cases,
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corruption.html.
I do not view judicial review of due process and an internal ethics rule of legislative recusal, see supra
note 5, as mutually exclusive but rather as potentially complementary.
For an excellent comparative survey, see generally ROSE-ACKERMAN, EGIDY & FAWKES, supra
note 10.
United Democratic Movement v. Speaker of the Nat’l Assembly 2017 (5) SA 300 (CC) (S. Afr.) (overturning
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all connected to the attempts to hold then-President Zuma accountable for
corruption, culminated in December 2017 when the Constitutional Court
held that the National Assembly had violated its constitutional obligation to
create a set of specially-tailored procedural rules for the impeachment of a
president, and ordered it to do so “without delay.”118
Also in 2017, the Israeli Supreme Court struck down a tax law on
procedural grounds alone for violating the right of all legislators to
meaningfully participate in the lawmaking process, when they received the
final version of an omnibus tax bill at the last minute.119 The German
Constitutional Court in 2010 invalidated the federal parliament’s recent
amendment of the country’s welfare legislation because the flawed procedure
that it used to determine the subsistence minimum violated the constitution.120
Finally, the Colombian Constitution expressly grants the Constitutional
Court the power to review legislation for errors of procedure,121 and in
addition to fairly frequent exercise for violating the detailed textual procedural
rules,122 the Court has also invalidated a tax law for violating the “unwritten”
principle of “minimum public deliberation.” This occurred when the
government, in an attempt to close the budget deficit, added increased ValueAdded Tax (“VAT”) rates on certain necessities at the last minute with no
notice to legislators just before the final vote.123
Although none of these examples deal (at least directly) with the problem
of legislative corruption, they do add the weight of broadly successful
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Speaker’s decision that she lacks power to hold secret ballot for motion of no-confidence); Econ.
Freedom Fighters v. Speaker of the Nat’l Assembly 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC) (S. Afr.) (holding that the National
Assembly violated its constitutional obligation to hold president accountable); Mazibuko v. Sisulu
2013 (6) SA 249 (CC) (S. Afr.) (holding that Rules violate constitutional right of individual MPs to
table a motion of no-confidence in the president); Oriani-Ambrosini v. Sisulu 2012 (6) SA 588 (CC) (S.
Afr.) (holding that National Assembly Rules violate constitutional right of individual MPs to
introduce legislation).
Econ. Freedom Fighters and Others v. Speaker of the Nat’l Assembly 2018 (2) SA 571 (CC), at
para. 216 (S. Afr.).
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See Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa & David Landau, Colombian Constitutional Law: Leading Cases
323–24 (2017).
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Sentencia C-776 (Colom.), discussed and translated in ESPINOSA & LANDAU, supra note 122, at
318–23.
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experience to the more general argument for judicial review of process,
which is commonly viewed in this country as more problematic than review
of legislative outputs.124 Apart from the pragmatic point that this misses a
potentially useful and effective opportunity to help fix what almost everybody
regards as broken, and the textual/doctrinal one that “due” legislative
process implies the existence of “undue,” from a broader normative
perspective whatever the arguments (if any) that justify judicial review of
substance in a democracy would seem to apply at least as much to judicial
review of process.125 As mentioned previously, this is because procedural
review far more rarely than substantive review, if ever, leaves a legislature
constitutionally disabled from acting.126
This latter point leads to a final one. Is it realistic, one might wonder, to
think that the same courts which have circumscribed criminal bribery
statutes and Congress’s power to regulate money in politics, as well as expand
the scope of legislators’ criminal immunity, will come to understand and
apply due process in the way this Article proposes? Is this not in fact an
instance of what Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have labeled the
“inside/outside fallacy,” in which inconsistent and incoherent assumptions
about the motivations of actors within the legal system are made in the
diagnostic and prescriptive sections of a piece of work?127 While not
necessarily claiming this course of action to be likely, after all predicting
judicial behavior is mostly a fool’s errand, I do not believe it is unrealistic, or
that the argument relies on inconsistent assumptions about the motivation of
judges. The reason is precisely this less “drastic” nature of the judicial
intervention called for here—the regular fare of invalidation plus the
possibility of re-enactment by means of due rather than undue process—as
compared with either incarceration or other punitive measures against
individual legislators, or direct restriction on political speech and
campaigning. In other words, the concerns that might motivate the courts
in their First Amendment, Speech and Debate Clause, and statutory criminal
law rulings may well not apply in the legislative due process context. This is
especially the case when the comparative effectiveness of judicial versus nonjudicial enforcement of due process is taken into account.
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See Bar-Siman-Tov, Puzzling Resistance, supra note 10, at 1925–26.
For a helpful survey of the general arguments for judicial review of legislative process, see id. at
1970–74.
See id. at 1954–58.
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1743, 1745
(2013).
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CONCLUSION
The aims of this Article have been (1) to reintroduce, develop, and extend
the core principle that Congress is bound by a constitutional requirement of
due process of lawmaking, (2) to present the case for judicial review and
enforcement of this duty, and thereby (3) to provide the basis for a specifically
legal and effective response to concerns raised about the undue influence of
donors in the legislative process, as exemplified in the enactment of the recent
tax law. Although it does provide some provisional guidance as to the scope
and extension of this core principle—even if (or just because) questionable
conduct falls short of criminal bribery, this does not mean it is “OK,” or
legitimate, in terms of due process of lawmaking—the Article does not fill in
the full contours and content of the constitutional duty placed on Congress.
This must be left to future work.
Similarly, this Article obviously does not provide a full solution to the
profound problem of the endemic or systemic corruption of Congress and
the skewing of democracy resulting from the recent vast (related) increases in
both the amount of money flowing into politics—through direct and indirect
expenditures, as well as lobbying—and the cost of election and reelection
campaigns. When sophisticated political pundits evaluate candidates’
electability (“viability”) by the amount of funds in their war chests, when
presidents and presidential candidates only ever set foot in non-battleground
states, such as California, to attend fundraisers, when a flawed candidate
faces no serious primary challenge to be its presidential candidate from a
member of her political party because she has locked up all its major donors
at the outset,128 the republic is, if not already lost, clearly in deep trouble. To
save it, far more than judicial review of the due process of lawmaking for
actions that actually constitute, come close to, or give the appearance of,
bribery is obviously required. Nonetheless, in the meantime, the
Constitution is not completely defenseless against the most harmful forms of
corruption and undue influence in lawmaking. While they may be relatively
rare, the enactment of the tax law is further evidence that donors are
employing ever more brazen and strong-arm tactics against the integrity of
the legislative process; in essence, engaging in a form of political looting.
128
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primaries began, was not widely viewed as a serious challenger to Hillary Clinton. See, e.g., Dan
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The institutional independence of Congress is at a minimum where its
members are beholden to donors for reelection, where hyperpolarized
politics leaves no room for moderation, and where the same party controls
both the executive and legislative branches. When this combination exists,
as now, it is the perfect storm for excess, with few effective constraints on
power and the pursuit of naked self-interest. This is when it is critical for the
courts to play their designated role in our constitutional democracy as the
ultimate check on political overreaching.

